12/11/2022 0 Comments Nasa space shuttle accidentsDet konkluderes med at 22.juli-kommisjonen var god på kontrafaktisk analyse, å vurdere om patruljens håndtering kunne gitt et bedre utfall om de hadde handlet annerledes, mens den var dårlig på å hjelpe oss med å få en bedre forståelse av hvorfor patruljen handlet som den gjorde. Det argumenteres for at en viktig grunn til de forskjellige konklusjonene vedrørende patruljens håndtering handler om forskjeller i analyseperspektiv, herunder hva som er undersøkelsens formål og vurderingskriterier. Til sammenligning konkluderte 22.juli-kommisjonen med at patruljen ikke fulgte ordre og at de handlet feil fordi de burde ha skaffet båt for å aksjonere selv. Konklusjonen er at patruljens håndtering er forståelig og at de fulgte ordre som var gitt. Patruljens håndtering analyseres ved hjelp av et situert sanntidsperspektiv. Artikkelen diskuterer spørsmålet gjennom en case studie av håndteringen til politipatruljen som først ankom fastlandet ved Utøya under terrorangrepene 22. Hvordan påvirker valg av analyseperspektiv krisekommisjoners vurderinger og konklusjoner? Spørsmålet er av betydning fordi krisekommisjonsrapporter kan påvirke myndighetenes problemforståelse, påfølgende læringsprosesser og spørsmål om ansvarsutkreving. This finding is explained by ‘classic’ political science explanations and more contemporary policy-orientated explanations, which both suggest that inquiries would do well to future-proof their recommendations from hostile public sector environments if they wish them to be more frequently implemented. Both methods led to a conclusion that Australian Royal Commissions have not been extensively implemented in the twenty-first century. Stage two interviewed key stakeholders with an interest in each Commission to ascertain whether they propelled substantive policy reforms and the reasons which might explain their success or failure in this regard. Stage one tracked 444 Royal Commission recommendations across six cases to determine the proportion that was implemented or ‘shelved’ by the government. The findings have been produced from a three-year project which has operationalised a two-stage methodology. This article examines the extent to which twenty-first century, federal-level Royal Commissions in Australia have been implemented. The inescapable conclusion emerging from the CAIB report is that NASA failed to learn the obvious lessons flowing from the Challenger disaster, which caused the demise of Columbia (see, e.g. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) found that little had changed since the Challenger disaster: ‘By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger accident - such as inadequate concern over deviations, a silent safety programme, and schedule pressure - had returned to NASA’ (CAIB 2003: 101). The Rogers Commission, which studied the causes of the Challenger disaster, criticised the space organisation for not responding adequately to internal warnings about the impending disaster. Both commissions were scathingly critical of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA). Both disasters were studied by a presidential commission. The Challenger disaster was etched in the minds of an entire generation of American schoolchildren, who watched the launch in their classes (the teacher Christa McAuliffe was on board to teach elementary school students from space). Seventeen years before (28 January 1986), Space Shuttle Challenger had exploded within 2 minutes of its launch. The drama unfolded live on television: spectacular pictures of the doomed flight were punctuated by reactions of devastation and loss. Introduction: did NASA learn from the Challenger disaster? On 1 February 2003, the Columbia Space Shuttle disintegrated during the final stages of its return flight to earth.
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